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Abstract Since the start of the coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, there has been interest in using wastewater monitoring as an approach for disease surveillance. A significant uncertainty that would improve the interpretation of wastewater monitoring data is the intensity and timing with which individuals shed RNA from severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) into wastewater. By combining wastewater and case surveillance data sets from a university campus during a period of heightened surveillance, we inferred that individual shedding of RNA into wastewater peaks on average 6 days (50% uncertainty interval (UI): 6–7; 95% UI: 4–8) following infection, and that wastewater measurements are highly overdispersed [negative binomial dispersion parameter, k = 0.39 (95% credible interval: 0.32–0.48)]. This limits the utility of wastewater surveillance as a leading indicator of secular trends in SARS-CoV-2 transmission during an epidemic, and implies that it could be most useful as an early warning of rising transmission in areas where transmission is low or clinical testing is delayed or of limited capacity. 

Inference of person-to-person transmission networks using surveillance data is increasingly used to estimate spatiotemporal patterns of pathogen transmission. Several data types can be used to inform transmission network inferences, yet the sensitivity of those inferences to different data types is not routinely evaluated.

The influence of different combinations of spatial, temporal, and travel-history data on transmission network inferences forPlasmodium falciparummalaria were evaluated.

The information content of these data types may be limited for inferring person-to-person transmission networks and may lead to an overestimate of transmission. Only when outbreaks were temporally focal or travel histories were accurate was the algorithm able to accurately estimate the reproduction number under control,R_c. Applying this approach to data from Eswatini indicated that inferences ofR_cand spatiotemporal patterns therein depend upon the choice of data types and assumptions about travel-history data.

These results suggest that transmission network inferences made with routine malaria surveillance data should be interpreted with caution.

 

Background The COVID-19 pandemic has induced unprecedented reductions in human mobility and social contacts throughout the world. Because dengue virus (DENV) transmission is strongly driven by human mobility, behavioral changes associated with the pandemic have been hypothesized to impact dengue incidence. By discouraging human contact, COVID-19 control measures have also disrupted dengue vector control interventions, the most effective of which require entry into homes. We sought to investigate how and why dengue incidence could differ under a lockdown scenario with a proportion of the population sheltered at home. Methodology & principal findings We used an agent-based model with a realistic treatment of human mobility and vector control. We found that a lockdown in which 70% of the population sheltered at home and which occurred in a season when a new serotype invaded could lead to a small average increase in cumulative DENV infections of up to 10%, depending on the time of year lockdown occurred. Lockdown had a more pronounced effect on the spatial distribution of DENV infections, with higher incidence under lockdown in regions with higher mosquito abundance. Transmission was also more focused in homes following lockdown. The proportion of people infected in their own home rose from 54% under normal conditions to 66% under lockdown, and the household secondary attack rate rose from 0.109 to 0.128, a 17% increase. When we considered that lockdown measures could disrupt regular, city-wide vector control campaigns, the increase in incidence was more pronounced than with lockdown alone, especially if lockdown occurred at the optimal time for vector control. Conclusions & significance Our results indicate that an unintended outcome of lockdown measures may be to adversely alter the epidemiology of dengue. This observation has important implications for an improved understanding of dengue epidemiology and effective application of dengue vector control. When coordinating public health responses during a syndemic, it is important to monitor multiple infections and understand that an intervention against one disease may exacerbate another. 

Bluetongue virus (BTV) is an arthropod-borne, segmented double-stranded RNA virus that can cause severe disease in both wild and domestic ruminants. BTV evolves via several key mechanisms, including the accumulation of mutations over time and the reassortment of genome segments.Additionally, BTV must maintain fitness in two disparate hosts, the insect vector and the ruminant. The specific features of viral adaptation in each host that permit host-switching are poorly characterized. Limited field studies and experimental work have alluded to the presence of these phenomena at work, but our understanding of the factors that drive or constrain BTV's genetic diversification remains incomplete. Current research leveraging novel approaches and whole genome sequencing applications promises to improve our understanding of BTV's evolution, ultimately contributing to the development of better predictive models and management strategies to reduce future impacts of bluetongue epizootics. 

By March 2020, COVID-19 led to thousands of deaths and disrupted economic activity worldwide. As a result of narrow case definitions and limited capacity for testing, the number of unobserved severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections during its initial invasion of the United States remains unknown. We developed an approach for estimating the number of unobserved infections based on data that are commonly available shortly after the emergence of a new infectious disease. The logic of our approach is, in essence, that there are bounds on the amount of exponential growth of new infections that can occur during the first few weeks after imported cases start appearing. Applying that logic to data on imported cases and local deaths in the United States through 12 March, we estimated that 108,689 (95% posterior predictive interval [95% PPI]: 1,023 to 14,182,310) infections occurred in the United States by this date. By comparing the model’s predictions of symptomatic infections with local cases reported over time, we obtained daily estimates of the proportion of symptomatic infections detected by surveillance. This revealed that detection of symptomatic infections decreased throughout February as exponential growth of infections outpaced increases in testing. Between 24 February and 12 March, we estimated an increase in detection of symptomatic infections, which was strongly correlated (median: 0.98; 95% PPI: 0.66 to 0.98) with increases in testing. These results suggest that testing was a major limiting factor in assessing the extent of SARS-CoV-2 transmission during its initial invasion of the United States. 

Policymakers must make management decisions despite incomplete knowledge and conflicting model projections. Little guidance exists for the rapid, representative, and unbiased collection of policy-relevant scientific input from independent modeling teams. Integrating approaches from decision analysis, expert judgment, and model aggregation, we convened multiple modeling teams to evaluate COVID-19 reopening strategies for a mid-sized United States county early in the pandemic. Projections from seventeen distinct models were inconsistent in magnitude but highly consistent in ranking interventions. The 6-mo-ahead aggregate projections were well in line with observed outbreaks in mid-sized US counties. The aggregate results showed that up to half the population could be infected with full workplace reopening, while workplace restrictions reduced median cumulative infections by 82%. Rankings of interventions were consistent across public health objectives, but there was a strong trade-off between public health outcomes and duration of workplace closures, and no win-win intermediate reopening strategies were identified. Between-model variation was high; the aggregate results thus provide valuable risk quantification for decision making. This approach can be applied to the evaluation of management interventions in any setting where models are used to inform decision making. This case study demonstrated the utility of our approach and was one of several multimodel efforts that laid the groundwork for the COVID-19 Scenario Modeling Hub, which has provided multiple rounds of real-time scenario projections for situational awareness and decision making to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention since December 2020.